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Introduction
Between 1970 and 2000, real income growth failed to keep pace with population growth in Sub Saharan 
Africa (SSA). After posting a modest average annual growth rate in real per capita income of about 0.7 per 
cent during the 1970s, these rates turned negative during the 1980s and 1990s (-1.0 and -0.5 per cent respec-
tively). SSA countries have posted improved growth rates since 2000, thanks largely to commodity-driven 
recoveries (see Table 1).2 Even so, real per capita income is still barely higher than in 1970. Furthermore, this 
weak and erratic growth performance has been accompanied by regressive trends in income distribution (Geda 
and Shimeles, 2007), with a particularly marked drop in the average per capita income for the poorest 20 per 
cent in SSA (UNCTAD, 2001: 53). Not only is this likely to undermine efforts to develop human resources, 
and strengthen political cohesion in SSA, it is also likely to restrict future growth prospects.
In this paper, we review the SSA experience under structural adjustment programs, discuss recent 
growth in the wake of the global commodity price boom, and distinguish causes from effects. The remainder 
1  We are grateful to Richard Kozul-Wright for his suggestions to improve this paper and to Miriam Rehm for her 
editorial assistance, but implicate neither of them.
2  Also Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for statistics on growth and levels of real income per capita in SSA countries.2  DESA Working Paper No. 67
of the paper is organized as follows. The first section examines growth and poverty trends in more detail. In 
the following section, we review the progress—or lack thereof—of capital formation and economic diversifi-
cation in Africa, and discuss the impact of foreign (FDI, portfolio flows, aid) and domestic (public and pri-
vate saving) sources of capital to finance development. The big policy challenge is to reverse the role of SSA 
as a net capital exporter. In the following section, we look more closely at the trade and development nexus. 
The central issue here is the region’s ongoing reliance on commodity exports. Locked into extractive resource 
industries, with few linkages to the rest of the economy, and fighting associated ‘Dutch disease’, SSA coun-
tries have not been able to sufficiently diversify their export base, while the falling terms of trade for generic, 
low-skill labour-intensive manufactures limit the developmental impact of expansion in this area. Neglect of 
food agriculture certainly has not helped, but the removal of developed country agricultural protection in a 
Doha agreement is not much of a panacea. A final section offers some concluding remarks.
Growth and poverty reduction in a shifting policy environment
The African development policy landscape has changed radically over the last three decades. Liberalization 
and privatization measures aimed at opening up to global market forces and attracting private investment 
have replaced state intervention and public ownership, e.g. building infant industries. Ironically, while 
policy debates during the pre-liberalization developmental era seriously considered the interactions between 
external and internal factors, the subsequent liberalization era has tended to focus almost exclusively on the 
‘domestic’ determinants of economic performance, assuming that external market forces are benign and price 
perfecting, thereby carrying a strongly positive influence on economic performance and prospects.3
The policy shift dates back to 1981, when the World Bank published the influential Accelerated De-
velopment in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, often referred to as the Berg Report, after its principal 
author, Elliot Berg, from the University of Michigan’s Economics Department. This report recommended 
adopting a more outward-oriented program of raw materials exports, eliminating subsidies and controls, and 
letting market forces determine the prices for raw materials exports. The international sovereign debt crises 
from the early 1980s provided an opportunity for the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) to broaden this 
agenda and impose it on recalcitrant governments through policy conditionalities for providing desperately 
needed credit.
While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was initially responsible for short-term macroeco-
nomic stabilization programs, and the World Bank for medium-term structural adjustment programs (SAPs), 
these converged around what was subsequently dubbed the ‘Washington Consensus’. That Consensus is gen-
erally seen as spearheading the global trend towards greater economic liberalization since the 1980s. While 
its policy priorities have changed over time (responding, in part, to poorer than expected economic perfor-
mances in implementing countries), it has remained at the core of economic policy making across most of 
the African continent.4
There is little disputing that the developments in the world economy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s had a profound impact on SSA economic prospects. These undermined the profitability of private 
firms, led to a collapse in state revenues and added to the debt that had begun to accumulate in the mid-
1970s. A vicious downward spiral followed in many countries; with little prospect of raising export earnings 
3  More recently, this domestic focus has gone beyond economic policies to include institutions, governance, the role of 
rent-seeking elites, ethnic diversity, geography, etc.
4  See, for example, Stiglitz (1998) and Stein (2008). Economic Liberalization and Constraints to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  3
to maintain import levels, macroeconomic policies were tightened further, which in turn increased the con-
straints on investment, diversification and growth. The debt overhang from the 1970s mushroomed further, 
and by placing a further squeeze on investment in critical areas such as transport, health and education, 
further compromised some of the most essential conditions for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.
The BWIs (e.g. see Finance & Development, September 2002) have generally been quick to claim 
responsibility for economic success stories in the subsequent period, even as they have continued to deny 
the adverse consequences that have arisen from their recommended (or imposed) policies pursued by SSA 
governments. Rather, they have insisted that the slow growth is best explained by reluctance on the part of 
African policy makers to undertake governance reforms and to open up quickly enough, resulting in only 
partial implementation of adjustment programmes.5
However, the link between the structural adjustments required by the BWIs and economic growth 
has been weak: of the 15 countries identified as core adjusters by the World Bank in 1993, only three were 
subsequently classified by the IMF as strong economic performers while very few of the original 15 are 
among the current crop of strong performers. In fact, the recent cases of rapid growth by a few strong per-
formers can be explained by circumstances unrelated to structural adjustment policies. Mkandawire (2002) 
has argued that IMF-led ‘adjustment’ in Africa has placed the continent on a slow growth path, a position 
broadly supported by econometric studies of the broader impact of such programmes (Barro and Lee, 2002; 
Vreeland, 2003). He notes that many of the oft-invoked ‘determinants’ of growth are themselves determined 
by growth (Macpherson and Goldsmith, 2001), particularly those associated with external economic integra-
tion. In this respect, the rapid opening up of SSA economies since the mid-1980s at a time of slower global 
growth was particularly ill-timed (Easterly, 2000).
Looking at real GDP growth rates suggests that SSA is beginning to recover after the ‘lost’ last quar-
ter of the 20th century (Table 2) thanks largely, but not exclusively, to a strong commodity boom. Despite 
this growth upturn, the region is mired in poverty, faces a dire lack of infrastructure, and retains a narrow 
export base, none of which are conducive to rapid and sustainable development.
Recent estimates by the World Bank6 include a substantial upward revision of the numbers of poor 
worldwide as measured by a poverty line of $1.25 per day at 2005 PPP, equivalent to $1 per day in 1996 US$ 
(Chen and Ravallion 2008: Tables 4, 5, 7, 8). About 1400 million people lived in poverty in 2005 (Table 
3). The new World Bank figures give a total of 384 million people living below the new poverty line in SSA. 
More than half of the population lives in poverty in SSA, the highest percentage in the world for any region.
The period since the early 1980s has also seen rising income inequality, as measured by the Gini 
index, reversing the trend of previous decades (Nel, 2003, Alemayehu and Shimeles, 2007: 306). Real wages 
5  See Alassane Ouattara (1997) and World Bank (2000). Commenting on the continuing stagnation of African per 
capita incomes, The Economist (2001: 12) argued that “it would be odd to blame globalization for holding Africa back. 
Africa has been left out of the global economy, partly because its governments used to prefer it that way”
6  According to earlier World Bank figures, the number of poor people in the developing world had decreased slightly 
from 1179 million in 1987 to 1120 million in 1998 (Chen and Ravallion 2008: Table 5). Meanwhile, the number 
of poor in SSA rose from 217 million in 1987 to 291 million in 1998, averaging around 46 per cent of the SSA 
population over the period (World Bank, 2001b: 17, 23). The proportion of the population with less than US$1 a day 
in the least developed African countries was still higher and rising, increasing from an average of 55.8 per cent in 1965-
1969 to 64.9 per cent in 1995-1999 (UNCTAD, 2002: Tables 19 & 20). 4  DESA Working Paper No. 67
have also fallen for many in the formal economy, including the nascent middle class in SSA, contributing to 
greater inequality and undermining prospects for a stable growth environment.
Higher growth in the last half-decade is believed to have raised incomes and reduced poverty levels 
in some SSA countries. However, growth based on resource extraction has also contributed to rising inequal-
ity and limited its employment effects, thereby dampening the impact on poverty reduction. In some cases, 
the combination of slower growth, rising inequalities and vulnerability to exogenous shocks has contributed 
to civil conflict, further trapping these countries in a vicious spiral of economic decline (Miguel, Satyanath 
and Sergenti, 2004).
World Bank estimates for a poverty line of US$1.25 at 2005 PPPEconomic Liberalization and Constraints to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  5
Resource mobilization for development
Strong and sustained growth is needed to address the development and poverty challenges across the SSA re-
gion; most observers put the target figure in the 6-8 per cent range annually (e.g. Blair Commission Report, 
2005). It is very difficult to reduce poverty through redistribution when average income levels are low, as in 
SSA. Further, political stability and prospects for development decrease with elevated economic insecurity 
(UN 2008). It is far from clear that the policies of the past two and a half decades have transformed the SSA 
context away from insecurity towards investment, growth and diversification.
Leaving markets to mobilize and allocate financial resources and determine interest rates is a central 
objective of the liberal policy agenda. Doing so should not only mean an increased willingness of households 
to save and hold financial assets, but also that scarce resources will be employed by the most productive 
firms regardless of their location. Financial liberalization7 promised to remove distortions arising from an 
artificially repressed financial sector, but also to strengthen the productive sector and ease the external pay-
ments constraint by channelling global savings to the most profitable investments in the capital-scarce poorer 
countries of the world.
Particular attention has been paid to FDI as a driving force in such a process, and a more reliable 
source of financing trade deficits. In the next section, we discuss the often limited contribution of FDI in 
Africa, which has remained small compared to other developing regions, and highly concentrated in extrac-
tive industries. Portfolio flows, on the other hand, are in fact negative. Capital owners in Africa with access 
to liquid assets prefer to transfer them abroad. Unlike other developing regions, net portfolio flows have been 
consistently negative over longer time periods.
What remains as a potential source of finance? Aid, it turns out, is not necessarily as ineffective as 
many critics have suggested (Minoiu and Reddy, 2007), but it is unpredictable and, importantly, does not 
necessarily promote economic development goals. Increasingly, aid aims to alleviate the effects of disasters, or 
to strengthen welfare programs and social services, rather than to promote industrialization or infrastructure 
development.
Successful resource mobilization begins at home. However, statistics indicate that savings and invest-
ment rates are still low in SSA by international comparison, and reaching a high, sustainable growth path 
will have to include changing this—as part of creating a dynamic that reverses capital flight and increases 
more diversified, ‘developmental’ FDI, supported by tangible, predictable aid flows.
FDI flows: small and highly concentrated
Most African governments accepted the BWIs’ policies, expecting the promised ‘catalytic effect’ on foreign 
capital inflows with their stamp of approval. The actual response of private capital has, in the words of the 
World Bank, ‘been disappointing’ (quoted by Mkandawire, 2002b: 6). Even though rates of return to FDI 
7  As Arestis (2004) notes, the term “financial liberalization” does not have a standard meaning. He distinguishes between 
capital account liberalization involving, for example, the removal of regulations on offshore borrowing by financial 
institutions and non-financial corporations and on capital outflows, and the ending of multiple exchange rates, so 
that banks and corporations are free to borrow abroad and reserve requirements are kept at a minimum level; the 
liberalization of the domestic financial system characterized by the removal of controls on lending and borrowing 
interest rates, the removal of credit controls and permission to hold foreign currency deposits; and the liberalization of 
the stock market in which foreign investors are allowed to buy, earn income from and sell equities without restriction.6  DESA Working Paper No. 67
have generally been much higher in Africa than in any other region (Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma, 
1997; UNCTAD, 1995, 2005), this, however, has not made Africa much more attractive to foreign inves-
tors, ostensibly due to ill-specified and often intangible ‘risk factors’. Political instability certainly plays a role 
here, as Africa is systematically rated as more risky than warranted by economic indicators.
Even the recent mineral-led surge in FDI into Africa has produced only a marginal impact on 
Africa’s share of global FDI flows. Indeed, the share of global inward FDI to all African developing countries 
is still far below its 5 per cent share in the 1970s; the recent increase to 2.4 per cent only marks a return to 
Africa’s more modest share in the 1980s (see Table 4).
Table 5 shows country FDI shares for the top five SSA countries (of 47 countries), by volume of 
FDI in the 2000s. The top five countries—Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Chad—
are, except for South Africa, highly dependent on petroleum exports and foreign investment in this sector. 
Since 1990, these five countries have absorbed an average of 64 per cent of all FDI going to all 47 SSA 
economies. The exception here might be South Africa, which appears in the top five mainly due to the size of 
its economy, relative to other SSA countries.8
Increased FDI in SSA since the late 1990s has been cited as evidence that the economic tide is turn-
ing in SSA (Pigato, 2000). However, there is little evidence that the pattern of FDI in Africa is likely to bring 
sustained, broad-based economic growth and strong employment generation (UNCTAD, 2005).9 Much of 
that FDI has gone to mining, which is hardly influenced by macro-economic policy considerations. Some 
new investments have gone to expand or improve existing capacities, in sectors where monopolistic rents are 
high, such as beverages, cement and oil, gas and petroleum refining. FDI has also been drawn by one-time 
8  Table A4 in the Appendix shows that South Africa does not appear in the top twenty for FDI-to-GDP ratio. However, 
Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Chad are three of the four highest ranked countries.
9  As Mkandawire (2002) observes, this paper seeks to “help boost SSA’s image as an investment location” (Pigato 2000: 
2), justifying the positions advocated despite data suggesting otherwise.Economic Liberalization and Constraints to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  7
opportunities associated with privatization. For example, FDI to Ghana—hailed by the BWIs as a ‘success 
story’—peaked with privatization, with subsequent negative outflows. Moreover, much recent FDI through 
acquisitions has often been on heavily discounted ‘fire sale’ terms. Such investments accounted for about a 
sixth of FDI flows into Africa in the 1990s. In 1998 alone, privatization in SSA attracted US$684 million 
in FDI (UNCTAD). Such one-off sales explain the jump in FDI in the 1990s, but by the end of the 1990s, 
privatization-related FDI had slowed down. ‘Brown-field’ FDI acquisitions through privatization do not 
enhance economic capacities, but merely involve a change in ownership.
The end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1995, and of its successor Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (ATC) in 2005, has reduced new investments in this sector. Many such industries now only 
survive due to remaining, but eroding, trade preferences enjoyed in US and European markets. Similarly, 
logging and agricultural expansion have been especially encouraged in recent years as the Washington Con-
sensus effectively discourages (import-substituting) industrialization for Africa. While generating temporary 
and dangerous (owing to the high incidence of logging accidents) work locally, logging has also exacerbated 
water supply problems, floods, droughts and desertification. More generally, corruption and ongoing re-
source conflicts in Africa have been fuelled by such foreign interest in the continent’s natural resources.8  DESA Working Paper No. 67
Portfolio flows mainly speculative and negative
Highly speculative portfolio investment has been attracted by often temporary ‘pull factors’ such as high real 
domestic interest rates on treasury bills to finance budget deficits as well as temporary export price booms 
which have attracted large export pre-financing loans (Kasekende, Kitabire and Martin, 1997). Mkandawire 
(2002) notes, with concern, the predominance of portfolio over direct investments and ‘brown-field’ acquisi-
tions over ‘green field’ investments as consequences of the FDI policies adopted. Moreover, the overwhelm-
ing majority of portfolio flows—in the order of 9 out of every 10 dollars invested in the region -- goes to 
South Africa.
Incredibly, despite growing poverty, Africa has been a net exporter of capital. In 1990, 40 per cent of 
privately held wealth was invested outside Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1997; Collier, Hoeffler and Patillo, 
1999; quoted by Mkandawire, 2002). In the period 1970-1996, capital flight from SSA came to US$193 
billion; with imputed interest, the value goes up to US$285 billion (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2000), compared 
to SSA’s combined debt of US$178 billion in 1996 (Mkandawire, 2002). Ndikumana & Boyce (2002) argue 
that capital flight from Africa has been largely debt-fuelled, though Collier, Hoeffler and Patillo (2004) claim 
that serious financial capital flight from Africa has started to be reversed. The most recent estimates of net 
external assets are probably from Ndikumana & Boyce (2008: 6) who report that:
“[r]eal capital flight over the [1970-2004] period amounted to about $420 billion (in 2004 dol-
lars) for the 40 countries as a whole. Including imputed interest earnings, the accumulated stock 
of capital flight was about $607 billion as of end-2004. …..Their net external assets (accumu-
lated flight capital minus accumulated external debt) amounted to approximately $398 billion 
over the 35-year period. To give a sense of the relative magnitude of the region’s net external 
position, the region’s external assets are 2.9 times the stock of debts owed to the world. For some 
individual countries, the results are even more dramatic: for Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Angola, 
and Nigeria the external assets are 4.6, 5.1, 5.3, and 6.7 times higher than their debt stocks, 
respectively”.
Even World Bank economists concede that the effects of financial liberalization have been ‘very 
small’ (Devajaran, Easterly and Pack, 1999). They argue that capital flight may be good for Africa—“The 
much-denigrated capital flight out of Africa may well have been a rational response to low returns at 
home…. Indeed, Africans are probably better off having made external investments than they would have 
been if they invested solely at home!” (Devajaran, Easterly and Pack, 1999: 15-16)—and conclude that there 
is ‘over-investment’ in Africa. Devajaran, Easterly and Pack (1999: 23) argue that “we should be more careful 
about calling for an investment boom to resume growth in Africa… [and] about Africa’s low savings rate…, 
[p]erhaps… due to the fact that the returns to investment were so low. Also, the relatively high levels of capi-
tal flight from Africa may have been a rational response to the lack of investment opportunities at home”.
These claims can be contested on both methodological and econometric grounds. First, in the 
standard approach in growth empirics, investment should be measured in international prices. However, the 
study used domestic prices, which generally overestimate investment rates because of the high cost of doing 
business in Africa. Second, they used cross-sectional regressions that do not account for country-specific ef-
fects. Such an omission can lead to inconsistent estimates.10 But, more importantly, as Mkandawire (2002) 
notes, the social benefits—to the national economy—of citizens investing in their own country exceed the 
private benefits accruing to individual investors.
10  We owe these observations to Carl Gray and Oumar Diallo, who have also provided other valuable comments and 
suggestions. Economic Liberalization and Constraints to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  9
Aid: unpredictable and welfare-oriented
The role of aid for development has been debated for decades. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1944) laid the foun-
dations for the idea of an externally-funded ‘big push’ for development of then so-called ‘backward areas’ 
through the realization of scale economies. Subsequently, in the post-war development paradigm, substantial 
foreign aid was seen as necessary to provide financing and balance-of-payments support for such large-scale 
industrialization and development programs. This broadly structuralist development literature and its deriva-
tive policy recommendations have been challenged by more market-friendly economists worried that aid 
would crowd out more efficient private investment and undermined by the economic policy conditionalities 
and recommendations of the multilateral institutions during the 1980s. Currently, that debate echoes in the 
context of African development challenges through the conflicting positions of Jeffrey Sachs (2005) and Wil-
liam Easterly (2001; 2007), with the former arguing for a new ‘big push’, requiring much more plentiful and 
reliable aid flows, and the latter arguing that the private investment needed has been crowded out by large 
aid flows to the region.
Aid statistics are notoriously controversial. As the UNCTAD (2006) report on ‘Making the Big Push 
work’ notes, it is well known that a large percentage of aid—as reported by donor countries to the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—never actually reaches the intended recipients. UNCTAD 
(2006: 14) quotes a study from the NGO Action Aid, saying that about 60 per cent per cent of bilateral 
donor assistance in 2003 “never materializes for poor countries, but is instead diverted for other purposes 
within the Aid system”.
The statistics available also indicate that aid to Africa has been highly volatile. Figure 1 shows the 
regional composition of total aid flows among the four major developing country regions—Oceania, Asia, 
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the mid-1990s, before falling off precipitously to 20 per cent in 1999; its share then rose to over 60 per cent 
in 2003, only to fall back to 39 per cent in 2005. 11
Weighted by regional GDP per capita, the picture looks different. GDP per capita is an admittedly 
crude gauge of aid requirements—presuming that the lower income per capita, the higher the need for aid. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Africa’s share in the past four decades is lower by roughly fifteen percentage points. 
On the other hand, aid by recipient region, independent of the income level in the region, reflects the very 
large populations of China and India. Aid flows per person (per annum) to Asian countries are lower, while 
Africa’s per capita (per annum) aid receipts are the highest for the three developing regions—Asia, Africa 
and Latin America and the Caribbean. From a low of US$17 in 2000, these flows increased to US$38 per 
person, though part of the volatility is due to reporting in US dollars and the vicissitudes of the greenback. 
Lastly, relative to GDP, Africa receives the largest portion of aid, roughly 5 per cent of GDP.12
To what extent, though, does aid reach its target? In fact, for many countries, much aid is for debt 
relief and debt repayment, meaning it does not help to finance development in any way. The old idea—that 
aid is supposed to help finance a balance of payments deficit in the face of imports of machinery and tech-
nology necessary to start a virtuous circle of growth and development on the one hand, and volatile and 
structurally declining commodity export revenues on the other—appears turned on its head, as many Afri-
can countries become net exporters of capital. See Table 6 for statistics on net debt transfers, which are dis-
11  Note that both Latin American and African developing countries experienced this decline after 2003. The increase in 
Asia’s share of total aid may have been due to large amounts of emergency aid in the wake of severe natural disasters, 
such as the Indian Ocean tsunami.
12  See Figures A1, A2 and A3 in the Appendix.Economic Liberalization and Constraints to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  11
bursements of loans less debt service (principal plus interest payments) from all sources of credit. However, a 
detailed critical review of the IMF argument claiming aid ineffectiveness—in terms of promoting growth—
suggests that the conclusion is reversed once politically-driven aid is factored out (Minoiu and Reddy 2008).
As mentioned before, much of the developing world consists of net capital exporters, but the aggre-
gate statistics in Table 6 mask the differences among regions. Asia and, much more recently, Latin America 
freed themselves from the Washington-led aid nexus, with good export performances, as well as exchange rate 
and reserve strategies.13 The drain of capital from a host of countries in Africa, however, does not appear to 
be based on sustainable development strategies, and thus does not enhance the ability to afford repayment, 
but rather a combination of increased debt service and the slow trickle of real resource transfers from the 
developed world.
Trade and development
In line with the 1981 Berg Report, much World Bank research has suggested that Africa would gain most 
if it specializes in agriculture. Removal or reduction of subsidies and protection in the North would give 
farmers in SSA the opportunity to significantly increase their share of these markets. This section reviews the 
structure of African trade, particularly the potential of agricultural trade and problems related to the terms 
of trade and ‘Dutch disease’ for African development prospects. What and with whom does Africa trade, and 
how might that help or hinder development? The structural features of the region’s trade are an important 
starting point for trade policy, industrial policy and development policy.
African countries have experienced volatile and, by and large, unfavourable movements in their 
terms of trade for much of the post-independence period. First, except in recent years, prices of primary 
commodities have declined against those of manufactures, as suggested by Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch 
more than half a century ago (see Ocampo and Parra, 2006). Second, prices of tropical agricultural prod-
ucts have continued to decrease relative to temperate agricultural goods, as observed by W. A. Lewis (1969) 
decades ago. Third, recent decades have also seen the decline of the prices of generic manufactures where 
entry into industries (e.g. most clothing) has not been inhibited—unlike those activities protected by tech-
nological barriers, scale economies and strong intellectual property rights. Although Africa has experienced 
de-industrialization over recent decades, a few countries have developed garments industries which still enjoy 
(reduced) trade preferences and may therefore at least survive even if they do not expand due to the erosion 
of trade preferences with greater trade liberalization.
Table 7 underscores Africa’s declining marginal role in overall world trade. Africa’s share of world 
trade was small, but even this has declined in recent decades. African exports of manufactures and food have 
declined during this period, while exports of minerals and other agricultural products have risen, reflect-
ing the pressures of de-industrialization and changes in agricultural production, but also heavier reliance on 
mineral exports, particularly petroleum.
De-industrialization and the investment climate
Exchange rate, monetary and other policies in East Asia have ensured relative prices favourable to export 
industries (instead of non-tradeables), with preferential interest rates supporting investment and economic 
restructuring. Export promotion strategies have generally involved an investment-export nexus, including 
13  See, as well, Table A5 in the appendix for country-specific statistics on net debt transfers of SSA countries. 12  DESA Working Paper No. 67
measures to promote public investment, subsidized inputs (from state-owned enterprises and with preferen-
tial special exchange rates), direct subsidies (including tax incentives), selective credit allocation and other 
industrial policy instruments (Akyüz and Gore, 1996). Government instruments for stimulating investment 
and industrial development have been severely eroded by economic liberalization measures.
African countries had largely ‘adjusted’ by the 1990s, in the sense of adopting market-friendly 
economic policies and making corresponding institutional changes. Most African countries undertook cur-
rency devaluations, trade liberalization and privatization as well as various other investor friendly reforms, 
particularly towards foreign investors. Improvements in the terms of trade and favourable weather conditions 
have recently corrected for the deflationary bias of macroeconomic policies to bring about improvements in 
economic performance.
African savings rates are generally much lower than in fast growing Asian economies; the failure of 
Africans to raise their savings rates to finance higher investment and growth rates is often emphasized in ac-
counts of the policy challenges facing the region. However, causation is disputed. Keynesians argue that the 
causal chain runs from growth to investment to savings, and not the other way round. El Bedawi & Mwega 
(2000) and Mlambo & Oshikoya (2001) have found that causality runs from growth to investment in Africa 
as well. Capital needs are essentially determined by expected output, i.e. investment demand is driven by 
expected growth. Meanwhile, ‘endogenous growth theories’ also suggest that some ‘determinants of growth’ 
may themselves be dependent on growth.
The investment patterns following economic liberalization cannot be associated with high economic 
growth. Historically, investment, growth and productivity have evolved together, e.g. investment was as-
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era (Rodrik, 2001). Instead, economic liberalization has brought economic stagnation, de-industrialization 
and agricultural decline, rather than structural change induced by productivity gains and stronger domestic 
demand due to increasing incomes (Mkandawire, 1988; Singh, 1987; Stein, 1992; Stewart, 1994). The two 
countries that performed well were Botswana and Mauritius, both high growth economies not pursuing 
orthodox adjustment programmes.
De-industrialization in SSA has been severe,14 as reflected in Table 8, which reports the GDP com-
position of SSA economies excluding South Africa, both by expenditure and broad categories of value added. 
First, ‘adjustment’ orchestrated by the BWIs has insisted on reducing government expenditure, which fell 
from an average 20 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 13 per cent during 2000-2006. Even the initial level 
was low, compared to the developed world, and such spending cuts have not only affected social spending, 
but also economic expenditure, e.g. on infrastructure. With strong crowding-out effects linked to these de-
clines in public investment (UNCTAD, 2003), it is not surprising that the average share of industry in value 
added fell from 21 per cent in the 1970s to 9 per cent in the years since 2000.
Deindustrialization has been worse for the region’s major petroleum exporters where the share of 
manufacturing in value added fell from 21 per cent in the 1960s to 5 per cent between 2000 and 2006. (See 
Table 8 for statistics on GDP composition for Africa’s major petroleum exporting countries.) However, the 
decrease in government spending has been less drastic in these countries, presumably due to greater fiscal 
space thanks to natural resource extraction.15
14  See, as well, Jalilian and Weiss (2000) on the issue of SSA de-industrialization. 
15  Tables A6, A7 and A8 report the composition of GDP by expenditure and sectoral production for all developing 
economies, Asian developing economies, and major developing country exporters of manufactures, respectively. These 
statistics point to the crucial importance of manufacturing activities for development. 14  DESA Working Paper No. 67
When most other developing economies embarked on import substitution industrialization in the 
1950s, Africa was still under colonial rule and remained so, well into the 1960s. Consequently, the im-
port substitution phase in most of SSA was relatively short, lasting barely a decade in many countries due 
to the lateness of independence and the early onset of economic slowdown due to the 1970s’ oil shocks 
(Mkandawire, 1988). Import compression following the debt crisis led to lower utilization of existing capac-
ity and a fall in investment, and prevented many countries in SSA from making a positive adjustment to 
the changed global environment. In this context, trade liberalization, beginning in the 1980s, prematurely 
exposed African ‘infant’ industries to global competition with much more mature industries, causing de-
industrialization. UNIDO notes that African countries had been increasingly gaining comparative advantage 
in labour-intensive manufacturing before such forced import liberalization. Given the BWI presumption 
that import substitution was bad, there was no attempt to see how such industries could form the bases for 
new export initiatives. Presuming that African import-substituting industries had been protected for far too 
long, and would never become viable, let alone internationally competitive, the policy was simply to aban-
don existing industrial capacity.
The growth rates of manufacturing value added have fallen from the 1970s, and actually contracted 
by an average of one per cent annually during 1990-1997 (UNIDO: 245, quoted in Mkandawire, 2002). 
UNIDO found that in ten industrial branches in 38 African countries, labour productivity declined by seven 
per cent between 1990 and 1995. The decline in the measure of total factor productivity can also be attrib-
uted to de-industrialization.
Gains from trade liberalization?
As discussed earlier, agriculture and agricultural trade present a conundrum for Africa. Africa is at a com-
parative disadvantage with agricultural exports, relative not only to the developed world, with its protected 
‘green pastures’, heavy subsidies and industrial farming, but also to much of Asia and Latin America as well.
A basic premise of the Berg Report was that Africa’s supposed comparative advantage lay in agricul-
ture. If only the state would stop ‘squeezing’ agriculture through marketing boards and price distortions16, 
the supply-side response to agricultural producers would drive export-led growth. Subsequent changes in Af-
rica’s exports indicate no significant increase in activities in which African countries ostensibly had compara-
tive advantage. Indeed, after two decades of reforms, Africa’s share of global non-oil exports fell to less than 
half what it was in the early 1980s (Ng and Yeats, 2000, quoted by Mkandawire, 2002).
Recent high growth in large Asian economies, especially China, has probably contributed most to 
the recent increase in primary commodity prices, especially for minerals, inducing strong supply responses 
from many SSA countries helped by foreign direct investments from these same big Asian developing 
countries. However, and despite this upsurge, the African share of world exports still remains well below 
its earlier level. Moreover, the damaging consequences for sustainable development and food security have 
become apparent, and renewed attention is now being given to the issue as food prices rose sharply from 
late 2007.
Official development rhetoric continues to imply that small farmers in Africa would benefit greatly 
if agriculture were liberalized under a comprehensive Doha trade agreement. However, this is not an obvi-
ous conclusion. After all, many food importing African countries would be worse off without subsidized 
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food imports while very few economies are likely to be in a position to significantly increase their output and 
exports in the near term. African agricultural production and export capacities have been undermined by the 
last three decades of economic contraction and neglect.
Severe cuts in public spending under structural adjustment have caused a significant deterioration 
of infrastructure (roads, water supply, etc) and have undermined the potential supply response (UNECA, 
2003)17. Even World Bank estimates (Anderson and Martin 2005) of the overall welfare effects from mul-
tilateral agricultural trade liberalization do not suggest significant gains for SSA, but on the contrary, the 
likelihood of some losses. Gains from agricultural trade liberalization would largely accrue to existing major 
agricultural exporters, mainly from the Cairns Group,18 again of little benefit to most of SSA. Greater trade 
liberalization in manufactures with a non-agricultural market access (NAMA) agreement would further un-
dermine the potential for African industrialization. African market access to developed country markets are 
significantly secured through preferential market access agreements, rather than through past trade liberaliza-
tion per se. Further trade liberalization threatens to erode this advantage.
Next we will look at some of the issues related to trade liberalization and development in Africa in 
more detail. Trade liberalization results in an immediate loss of tariff revenue, which can be very significant 
in developing countries, especially the poorest ones, where tariffs have accounted for up to half of total tax 
revenue. Reducing these revenues severely reduces their fiscal capacities, and can severely aggravate debt 
problems with the need for new and increased borrowing in financial markets.Referring to rich countries’ 
claim that developing countries ought to repeal manufacturing tariffs before they can reduce agricultural 
subsidies, Dani Rodrik asked “[w]hy they need to be bribed by poor countries to do what is good for them 
is an enduring mystery”19. Similarly, one might ask why poor countries should agree to multilateral trade 
liberalization that they need to be compensated for.
‘Aid for Trade’ was initially proposed as a means to promote and finance trade facilitation. However, 
the debate over this proposal has recognized that trade liberalization generally involves ‘winners’ and ‘los-
ers’, even if the overall outcome is welfare-enhancing. Several important policy implications follow from 
this. First, developing countries should be compensated for their loss of productive and export capacities. 
Less productive enterprises, including small farmers facing subsidized agri-business competition from G-7 
and Cairns Group countries, can be expected to go out of business following trade liberalization. In many 
industrialized countries, many losers have been protected to varying degrees, e.g. manufacturing workers by 
welfare, unemployment support, retraining programs and the like. Second, most developing country govern-
ments cannot make up for such lost tariff revenues, and hence, need to be compensated by the richer coun-
tries. Third, developing countries—especially the least developed countries, African, Caribbean and Pacific 
small island developing states—need to be compensated to accept the erosion of existing preferences due to 
further multilateral trade liberalization. Fourth, and most importantly from a development point of view, 
there are considerable and uncertain costs involved in developing alternative internationally competitive 
productive and export capacities and capabilities. Fifth, developing countries have been very emphatic that 
‘aid for trade’ must be truly additional to promised official development assistance, which has never been 
17  Numerous studies have confirmed the importance of good infrastructure for production capacity enhancement and 
trade facilitation (see Badiane and Shively, 1998; Abdulai, 2000)
18  The Cairns Group is a group of 19 agriculture exporting countries, composed of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.
19  Dani Rodrik, ‘Don’t cry for Doha’, Daily Star (Egypt), 5 August 2008. 16  DESA Working Paper No. 67
delivered despite being in existence since the 1960s; otherwise, ‘aid for trade’ risks becoming a new excuse 
for imposing new conditionalities promoting trade liberalization.
The World Bank has long supported the World Trade Organization (WTO) in promoting trade 
liberalization, often citing projections made using a computable general equilibrium (CGE), the so-called 
LINKAGE model. A CGE model is essentially a system of equations, describing the ‘behaviour’ of firms, 
households, governments and so on. LINKAGE happens to be a particularly large CGE model with more 
than 40,000 equations. As in any economic model (or system of equations), the number of equations is 
matched by the number of variables. The data requirements for parameters and base year variables are tre-
mendous, and trade elasticities, in particular, are often mere “guesstimates” with nonetheless crucial implica-
tions. The effects of trade liberalization then are estimated by removing tariffs and subsidies, which enter the 
price equations affecting demand decisions.
World Bank projections of ostensible gains from complete trade liberalization (Anderson and Martin 
2005) have been significantly revised downwards from earlier estimates just a few years before, presumably 
owing to trade liberalization in the interim. More than 70 per cent of these gains accrue to rich countries, 
including two-thirds of the global benefits from agricultural trade liberalization, and even more for non-
textile manufacturers. More than two-thirds of the static gains to developing countries from trade liberaliza-
tion accrue to Argentina, Brazil and India in the case of agriculture, and to China and Vietnam in the case of 
textiles and garments.
As full trade liberalization is not under negotiation in the Doha Round, Anderson and Martin 
(2005) also considered several possible Doha Round scenarios of trade liberalization. Their most realistic 
scenario projects welfare gains by 2015 of $96 billion, a third of their estimated gains from full trade liberal-
ization, most of which, some $80 billion, or 83 per cent, flows to rich countries,.
Crucially, the LINKAGE model presumes that governments do not, cannot or do not want to 
increase either borrowing or expenditure, which means that the public deficit in the model remains constant. 
In order to achieve this, the government has to raise taxes after tariff removal. Thus, crucial issues—a thin 
tax base and a large informal sector—are assumed away, implying that taxes can be raised easily. Obviously, 
if taxes on household consumption are raised, private demand decreases. On the positive side, consumption 
increases because the prices of imports fall following tariff removal.
An overall positive estimate of gains from trade liberalization relies crucially on a large positive ex-
port supply response—which is a heroic assumption when internationally competitive productive and export 
capacities do not already exist, as in most developing countries, especially the poorest ones. Additional real 
income—from increased exports and higher consumption—is presumed to outweigh the impact of increased 
taxes on developing country households.
Most African governments cannot fully substitute lost tariff revenues with new and higher taxes. The 
main concessions African developing countries are expected to get from a Doha deal are reduced agricultural 
subsidies and tariffs in OECD countries, but the neglect of both infrastructure and agricultural development 
over two decades of BWI structural adjustment programmes has left these countries with little capacity to 
respond to such export opportunities. What, then, can Africa gain from a Doha deal? How likely are African 
countries to realize even the paltry $16 billion projected by this model for developing countries? Developing 
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$14 trillion in 2007—making $16 billion, or one tenth of one per cent, look fairly negligible rather than the 
big boost to development the Doha Round is touted to be.
Another World Bank study analyzed the effects on SSA countries of ‘complete’ trade liberalization 
under a Doha agreement. Its estimates suggest that SSA could gain substantially because “farm employment, 
the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real returns to farm land and unskilled labour, and real 
net farm incomes would all rise substantially in capital scarce SSA countries with a move to free merchandise 
trade” (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe, 2005: 26). According to the simulation results (Ander-
son, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe, 2005: 38, Table 2), SSA excluding South Africa could gain as much 
as $3.5 billion. SSA GDP in 2007, excluding South Africa, was roughly $550 billion (UNCTAD Handbook 
of Statistics 2008), implying total welfare gains of a little more than half of one per cent of 2007 GDP. This 
is much more than the tenth of one per cent in expected gains for all developing countries relative to 2007 
GDP discussed above—but is still not a lot. Some of the poorest and least developed countries in SSA are 
also expected to be net losers under ‘realistic’ Doha scenarios (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
2005: 48, Table 12).
To be sure, such gains from trade liberalization are one-time increases attributable to theoretical 
static comparative advantage gains. Such calculations ignore the realities behind the decline of African food 
agriculture in recent decades, for example. As discussed at length before, World Bank structural adjustment 
programmes helped undermine the meagre competitiveness of African smallholder agriculture. A compre-
hensive Doha agreement that lowers agricultural subsidies in the North would raise many imported food 
prices for developing countries, at least in the short to medium term, further reducing many of the ‘long 
term’ welfare improvements these models predict. Hence, it is important to consider the implications of 
reduced subsidies for food-importing countries as well as non-food farmers in all countries.
A more recent ‘large-scale’ investigation, based on the MIRAGE model (Bouet 2008), produced 
similar results; rich countries will capture 74 per cent of total gains, while middle income and LDCs will 
get 24 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. These welfare gains represent increases—in real income by 2015 
relative to the base year level—of three-tenths, two-fifths and four-fifths of one per cent respectively. SSA, 
excluding Zambia, South Africa and members of the Southern African Customs Union, should experience 
an increase in welfare of three-fifths of one per cent by 2015 relative to initial GDP. It is not surprising that 
these numbers are so close to those produced by LINKAGE, as the MIRAGE model is structurally compa-
rable and utilizes the same data set.
Bouet (2008) also summarized estimates for full trade liberalization from a variety of other CGE 
models. First, all the research papers reviewed by him expect trade liberalization to increase world GDP. Bouet 
(2008: 56) cautions, however, that “[t]his conclusion does not mean that all countries or all economic agents 
are better off. Liberalizing trade creates a ‘larger cake’, but some can get smaller pieces than others; if efficient 
redistribution mechanisms are put in place, all agents could experience increased welfare”. This too supports 
the case for the need to compensate losers. Several studies reviewed by Bouet (2008: Table 4.2) suggest SSA 
will be one of the losers in terms of welfare. Bouet, et al. (2005) found that rich countries would gain $19 bil-
lion, China and South Asia $1 billion each, while other developing countries would lose $3 billion.
The likely contribution of such different scenarios for poverty reduction varies greatly, and is further 
limited by the declining contribution of economic growth to poverty reduction due to rising inequality. In 
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development—as opposed to trade liberalization—the consequences of trade liberalization for sustainable 
development are dubious (Chang 2007; Reinert 2007).
Other estimates—not discussed by Bouet (2008)—suggest even more modest gains, with their 
impacts on poverty and inequality very sensitive to assumptions, definitions and data quality (e.g. Ackerman, 
2005). Using a simplified, but structurally similar model, Taylor and von Arnim (2006) show how heavily 
trade liberalization simulation results depend on assumptions. Allowing a bit more realism—unemployment, 
for example—makes clear that Africa will not gain, on balance, from trade liberalization. Their exercise sug-
gests that SSA is likely to experience welfare losses, even assuming the absence of macroeconomic shocks. The 
region is likely to experience a worsening trade balance, debt problems are likely to increase, and any short 
term gains in employment and GDP could evaporate quickly under the pressure of such strained balances.
Even though his model’s details differ, Kraev’s (2005) ‘alternative’ analysis of the effects of trade 
liberalization on GDP has a methodology and aims compatible with those of Taylor and von Arnim. By en-
dogenizing output, employment and the current account in a CGE framework, he estimates future risks and 
past losses due to trade liberalization. With the current account and employment endogenized, trade liber-
alization is found to induce macroeconomic volatility—with mostly negative effects for developing regions. 
Kraev considers two different scenarios. In the first, it is assumed that the trade balance remains unchanged, 
but that the level of demand is variable (implying the possibility of underemployment of resources). With 
trade liberalization, imports increase and domestic demand has to decrease to satisfy the external balance 
constraint. Results in this scenario suggest losses in the order of 10 per cent of GDP (Kraev 2005: 14, Table 
3) for SSA. The second scenario holds GDP constant, and varies the trade balance. As the level of demand 
remains unchanged, the trade balance worsens considerably, resulting in growing external deficits (Kraev 
2005: 15-16, Tables 4 and 5).
Polaski (2006) introduces unemployment and separates agricultural labour markets from urban 
unskilled labour markets in an otherwise ‘standard’ CGE model. She concludes that: (1) global gains from 
further trade liberalization will be very modest; (2) in sharp contrast to the World Bank’s full employment 
models, developing countries’ gains come overwhelmingly from market access for manufactured exports; 
and (3) the largest gains will accrue to countries such as China, while the poorest countries (mainly in SSA) 
will be net losers. Thus, global gains from any realistic negotiated agreement are close to negligible. “Full 
liberalization” would bring growth of about half a per cent. A “central Doha scenario” could be expected to 
increase base year global GDP by 0.19 per cent20, and a “central Doha scenario with ‘Special Products’ for 
Developing Countries” by 0.18 per cent (Polaski 2006: 22, Table 3.1). In contrast to the previously discussed 
studies, she found that developing countries’ aggregate GDP would decrease by $6.3 billion, while developed 
countries’ GDP would increase by $5.5 billion with an agreement dominated by agriculture. On the other 
hand, developing countries’ GDP would increase by $23 billion, while developed countries would increase by 
$30.2 billion with an agreement focusing on manufactures.
Crucially, these gross developing country aggregates obscure the likely impact of trade liberalization 
on Africa. SSA (excluding South Africa) would lose $122 billion with an agreement focusing on manufactur-
ing trade liberalization, despite the gains for developing countries as a whole (Polaski 2006: 26, Figure 3.4). 
SSA (excluding South Africa) would lose $106 billion with an agreement focusing on agricultural trade lib-
20  The “central Doha scenario” assumes that developed and developing countries decrease tariffs on agricultural 
(manufactured) products by 36 per cent (50 per cent) and 24 per cent (33 per cent) respectively. Export subsidies are 
eliminated completely, and domestic support is reduced by a third in all regions. Economic Liberalization and Constraints to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  19
eralization (Polaski 2006: 28, Figure 3.8). Polaski’s findings appear to more accurately reflect the widespread 
problems of lack of infrastructure, export capacities, and diminished competitiveness in both industry and 
agriculture in SSA.
Recent advances in international trade theory do not support the case for trade liberalization in SSA 
either (see Bernard, et al. 2007). ‘New trade theories’ and evolutionary studies of technological development 
suggest that countries risk being ‘locked’ into permanent slow growth by pursuing static comparative advan-
tage. It is now generally acknowledged that economic growth—particularly the accumulation of capacities 
and capabilities—precedes export growth. In that sense, trade can foster a virtuous circle, but cannot trig-
ger it. Meanwhile, UNCTAD has long pointed to the importance of growth for trade expansion, and, more 
specifically, to the weakness of the investment-export nexus, that accounts for the failure of many countries 
to expand and diversify their exports. Also, rapid resource reallocation is not generally feasible without high 
rates of growth and investment.
Africa’s export collapse in the 1980s and 1990s involved “a staggering annual income loss of US$68 
billion—or 21 per cent of regional GDP” (World Bank, 2000, quoted by Mkandawire, 2002). However, 
“Africa’s failures have been developmental, not export failure per se” (Helleiner, 2002a: 4). Rodrik (1997) 
has also argued that Africa’s ‘marginalization’ is not due to trade performance per se, although this may be 
seen as low by international standards. Another view suggests that Africa trades as much as is to be expected, 
given its geography and per capita income level. Indeed, “Africa overtrades compared with other developing 
regions in the sense that its trade is higher than would be expected from the various determinants of bilateral 
trade” (Coe and Hoffmaister, 1999; Foroutan and Pritchet, 1993).
Mkandawire (2002) notes that the advent of the WTO trade regime was expected to entail losses for 
Africa from the outset, especially with the loss of preferential treatment (from erstwhile colonial rulers and 
the European Union under the Lome Convention). Trade liberalization under WTO auspices has significant-
ly reduced the policy options available to developmental states, especially for trade, industrial or investment 
policy (Adelman and Yeldan, 2000; Panchamukhi, 1996; Rodrik, 2000a), though some (e.g. Amsden, 1999) 
argue that the WTO regime still leaves room for industrial policy initiatives.
Hence, in summary, there is considerable controversy concerning structure, assumptions and result-
ing estimates from particular models. Overall, though, there is broad agreement that gains for SSA countries 
from any realistically achievable Doha agreement are, with near certainty, negligibly small, if not negative. 
Besides, it is important to remember that neither computable general equilibrium (CGE) models nor theo-
retical debates about trade liberalization are directly relevant to the WTO negotiations.
With whom does Africa trade what?
Africa is less dependent on developed country demand for its exports today than when the debt crisis hit in 
the early 1980s (Table 9). Asia has emerged as a major trading partner while increased SSA trade integra-
tion has reduced the share of exports to the developed world from 74 per cent in the 1970s to 59 per cent in 
2000-2006. The export share to East Asia—which includes the ten ASEAN members plus China, Japan and 
South Korea—almost tripled from 5 per cent to 14 per cent.
However, most of this trade expansion is fairly recent. The share of exports for East Asia averaged 5 
per cent between 1970 and 1989, grew to 8 per cent in the 1990s, and has since jumped to 14 per cent. The 
growth of China’s demand for commodities since the late 1990s has been the driving force behind this trend. 20  DESA Working Paper No. 67
Notably, intra-SSA exports increased strongly from 5 per cent of total exports in the 1960s to 12 per cent in 
2000-06. Intra-regional trade also has significant potential for development, if it relies on and strengthens 
developmental linkages. The declining importance of industrialized countries’ markets for African com-
modity exporters may have reduced the continent’s direct vulnerability to the business cycles of the Western 
economies compared with the emerging economies of Asia.
Second, sourcing from emerging countries has increased. The lower part of Table 9 shows that the 
decline in the share of imports from developed countries is even more pronounced than for exports, with its 
share falling from 80 per cent in the 1970s to 53 per cent in 2000-2006. Similarly, as above, both Asian and 
intra-regional import sources have become more important, with the former rising from 7 per cent to 20 per 
cent, and the latter from 5 per cent to 12 per cent.
The apparent diversification in terms of the origin and destination of imports and exports decreases 
dependence and improves economic integration in some respects, but the greater reliance on minerals is wor-
rying. Also, the developmental implications of diversifying primary commodity export markets and import 
sources, with greater trade through neighbouring transit economies, should not be exaggerated. The persis-
tent reliance on exports of primary commodities, especially minerals, is telling, especially for SSA countries. 
Table 10 shows the share of primary commodity exports in total world exports and selected African country 
groups. The global share of commodity exports rose slightly from 1995-2000 to 2000-2006.
The upturns for a wide range of commodity prices, especially petroleum related products, have had 
important consequences. The share of these exports for all developing countries in Africa increased from 71 
per cent in 1995-2000 to about 73 per cent in 2001-2006, and from an overwhelming 96 per cent to 97 per 
cent for the major petroleum exporters in the region. This picture—aggregating all primary commodities—
obscures agricultural exports’ declining role, as reflected in the lower part of Table 10. For all developing 
economies in Africa, the average share of agricultural exports in total exports fell from 18 per cent to 12 
per cent between 1995-2000 and 2000-2006. The fall in the share of agricultural exports is likely due to a 
combination of much higher oil and other mineral prices—in excess of also rising agricultural commodity 
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This is underlined by the fact that Africa, particularly SSA, did not significantly increase the exports 
of manufactured goods in 2001-2006 as compared to 1995-2000 (Table 11). While developing economies in 
Asia export as much as 26 per cent of total manufactured goods in the world, Africa’s share of world manu-
factured exports does not reach 1%. This is even more pronounced for petroleum exporting countries in 
Africa—compared to petroleum exporters in other regions of the world—but holds for all of SSA, including 
South Africa.22  DESA Working Paper No. 67
More pronounced trade specialization or dependence is principally due to economic liberalization 
strategies pursued under the auspices of the Bretton Woods institutions. The period since the 1980s has seen 
a general neglect of agriculture, especially for food security,—often in the form of reduced public spending 
for infrastructure, agricultural research and development, extension services and agricultural subsidies—and 
some encouragement of export-oriented agriculture. Such policies undermined earlier commitments and ef-
forts in the interest of food security, rural development and even urban-rural redistribution, undermining the 
viability of small-scale farming, increasing reliance on food imports, and inadvertently crating the conditions 
for the food crisis since late 2007.
Meanwhile, developed countries strengthened their efforts to ensure their own food security and 
support their own farmers. More recently, they have begun promoting bio-fuels, ostensibly for energy securi-
ty and climate change mitigation, inadvertently precipitating the food price spikes. Indeed, the possibility of 
many developing countries gaining from increased agricultural exports has been frustrated by such increased 
protection and subsidies in rich economies. At the same time, trade preferences ensure better market access, 
particularly for former colonies, LDCs, African, Caribbean and Pacific economies. Table 12 summarizes av-
erage tariff rates in SSA vis-à-vis the developed world. As discussed further below, erosion of such preferential 
market access is a particular concern of African countries in negotiations over further trade liberalization.
Trade concentration, tropical fate and resource curse
By the end of the 1990s, it had become clear that the few acknowledged gains from trade for SSA were of 
a one-off character, often reflecting switches from domestic to foreign markets without much increase in 
overall output (Helleiner, 2002a, 2002b; Mwega, 2002; Ndulu, Semboja, and Mbelle, 2002). In some cases, 
manufactured exports increased even as the manufacturing sector contracted. “No major expansion occurred 
in the diversity of products exported by most of the Sub-Saharan African countries.… Indeed, the product 
composition of some of the African countries’ exports may have become more concentrated. Africa’s recent 
trade performance was strongly influenced by exports of traditional products which appear to have experi-
enced remarkably buoyant global demand in the mid-1990s” (Ng and Yeats: 21, quoted by Mkandawire, 
2002). Figure 2 confirms this, with the index of export diversification showing that Africa did not broaden 
its export base during 1995-2006. The index has actually declined slightly since 2004, probably due to the 
rise in commodity prices21.
The World Bank (1993: 77) noted that temperate countries grew, on average, by 1.3 percentage 
points more than tropical countries during the 1965-1990 period, after controlling for other factors. The 
study explains this significant tropical zone shortfall in terms of the greater prevalence of disease, poor soils, 
typhoons and other natural calamities in the tropics.
Surprisingly, the study seems to be oblivious to W. A. Lewis’ (1969; 1978) pioneering work seeking 
to explain economic performance in the tropics. Lewis (1978) argued that the tropics did not industrialize 
and grew slower than temperate settlements during the last period of globalization from the end of the 19th 
century. However, his data do not confirm his assertion in his chapter synopsis that “the trade of these new 
[temperate] settlements accelerated at about the same time as tropical trade, but grew much faster than tropi-
cal, US or European trade” (Lewis 1978: 194). Both the new temperate settlements’ and tropical countries’ 
exports grew faster than US or European trade.
21  In contrast, many Asian economies have seen considerable increases in their export diversification indices. However, 
the series shown here are too short—only beginning in the mid-1990s—to show improvement among ‘all developing 
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The tropics generally had more modest export bases than the temperate zone to begin with, sug-
gesting that the tropics were better able to respond to export demand despite the disadvantages they faced22. 
22  For the period 1883-1913, for example, French Indochina, Thailand, British Ceylon, West Africa, French West 
Africa and Madagascar all had average annual export growth rates of five per cent or more, while Brazil had 4.5 per 
cent. Among the new temperate settlements—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, South Africa and 
Uruguay—only Argentina and South Africa featured export growth rates above 5 per cent (see Lewis 1978: 195, Tables 
8.1 and 8.2).24  DESA Working Paper No. 67
Lewis emphasized that not all tropical countries have been able to take advantage of opportunities from in-
creased export demand. He suggested that the exports in greater demand were largely water-intensive; hence, 
only those areas with enough water to substantially increase their exports were able to take advantage of 
the new opportunities. Thus, the more arid tropical areas, e.g. in SSA, could not benefit from the increased 
demand for tropical products.
Some Southeast Asian newly industrializing countries and some other tropical countries have grown 
rapidly since the sixties, but most tropical countries have fared badly, especially in the last two decades of the 
20th century. It is not enough to simply attribute the tropical growth shortfall to ‘pests, diseases, typhoons 
and other natural calamities’, though such factors may have been important. As mentioned earlier, Lewis 
observed that the terms of trade for tropical commodity exports have deteriorated badly against temperate 
commodity exports. In the half century between 1916 and 1966, for example, the index for natural rubber 
fell from 100 to 16. This suggests that productivity gains in the tropics were largely lost to worsening terms 
of trade, with the situation worse where few productivity gains were made.
Many observers (e.g. Intal, 1997) have suggested that SSA has lagged behind in terms of agricultural 
development since the sixties due to inadequate agricultural R&D and infrastructure, crop and agronomic 
considerations as well as macroeconomic conditions. Higher temperate zone agricultural productivity has 
partly been due to long, sustained and large investments in agricultural R&D, which temperate zone devel-
oping countries have been better able to take advantage of. The tropical Green Revolution in rice farming 
since the sixties has mainly benefited irrigated farms in Southeast and South Asia, while arid zone agriculture 
in Africa has generally been left behind. The Southeast Asian success with tree crop agriculture may offer 
some opportunities for equatorial Africa. Significant investments in tree crop agricultural R&D (e.g. in rub-
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Sachs (1997) suggests that natural resource wealth is bad for growth. Curiously, the study defines 
natural resource abundance in terms of the ratio of net primary product exports to GDP in 1971, without 
distinguishing extractive non-renewable natural resources (especially minerals) from agricultural products. 
So-called Dutch Disease mainly involves the former, which tend to be very capital-intensive and only involve 
a small proportion of the population in extraction of the resource. Consequently, additional income from 
resource extraction mainly accrues to a few while appreciation of the country’s currency affects the entire 
population.
Agricultural exports generally involve much more of the population, and increased income usually 
accrues to all involved, diffusing the adverse consequences of currency appreciation. Most Southeast Asian 
high performing economies have been major agricultural exporters, helping offset problems associated with 
the mineral exports of Malaysia and Indonesia, in sharp contrast to, say, Nigeria. Generally better macro-
economic management—including undervalued exchange rates—has also helped, especially to check the 
tendency to indulge in expenditure on imports or non-tradeables.
Conclusions
Developments since the 1980s have fundamentally changed the environment and conditions for develop-
mental states attempting to pursue selective industrial or investment policy. Most importantly, economic 
liberalization—at both national and international levels—has seriously constrained the scope for government 
policy interventions, including selective industrial promotion efforts. This is especially apparent in interna-
tional economic relations, but is also true of the domestic policy environment, where WB and IMF policy 
conditionalities as well as WTO and other obligations have radically transformed the scope for national 
economic development policy initiatives.
There has been a widespread and rapid opening up of trade, investment, finance and other flows. 
Very often, such liberalization has been externally imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions as conditions 
to secure access to emergency credit during the debt crises of the 1980s and, more recently, in the wake of 
currency and financial crises. This has been especially true of much of Latin America and Africa, which expe-
rienced a ‘lost decade’ of economic growth in the 1980s. The 1990s were only slightly better, with sporadic, 
but not sustained growth spurts. While the Washington Consensus has been challenged, if not discredited 
in academic and even policy circles, revised versions continue to provide the ideological basis for economic 
analysis and policy-making in developing countries, especially in Africa, Latin America and other smaller 
economies.
Invariably, the circumstances of such policy changes as well as the limited policy capabilities of the 
governments concerned have meant that little preparation—in terms of a pro-active strategy or transitional 
policies to anticipate and cope with the implications of sudden exposure to new international competition—
has been undertaken. Few of the investment policy instruments of the past are viable or feasible options 
today, including many used successfully in post-war East Asia. Most of the main industrial policy tools were 
used by the advanced industrial economies, including those that now deny such selective industrial promo-
tion to others. Indeed, most advanced economies still have a plethora of policies and institutions involved in 
research and development (R&D), skills training, investment promotion and infrastructure provision, e.g. 
for the new information and communication technologies (ICT), and for export promotion.26  DESA Working Paper No. 67
Such policies and institutions are probably necessary, but certainly not sufficient for stimulating and 
sustaining economic growth and structural change for developing countries to try to ‘catch-up’. Additional 
initiatives are urgently needed to prevent such economies—already at a historical disadvantage in various 
respects—from falling further behind the industrially more developed economies of the North, as well as the 
other newly industrialized economies that have emerged in recent decades.
The preceding discussion strongly suggests that much of the conventional wisdom regarding African 
development and poverty is not only misguided, but often harmful. International financial liberalization has 
not improved growth, but has instead exacerbated volatility. For Africa, net capital outflows, facilitated by 
such liberalization, have exceeded ODA inflows—not only on a net, but even on a gross basis. Worse still, 
there is strong evidence that some of the economic policy advice given to and the conditionalities imposed 
on SSA governments have reflected vested interests and prejudices. In recent years, much emphasis has been 
given to promoting FDI, even though experiences elsewhere show that FDI generally tends to follow, rather 
than lead domestic investments. Not surprisingly, there continues to be limited FDI, mainly confined to 
the minerals sector, with limited employment and other benefits. Nonetheless, the economic policy reforms 
have enhanced the profitability and protection of FDI while reducing the trickle down benefits to domestic 
economies of such enclave investments.
Available evidence suggests that the gains from trade liberalization will be modest for the world 
economy, and even more so for developing countries, while gains for Africa are even less assured. There is 
considerable evidence that the main winners from agricultural trade liberalization will be the existing big 
agricultural exporters from North America, Australasia, Southeast Asia and the Southern Cone of Latin 
America. Nonetheless, many well-meaning advocates have joined in the chorus calling for agricultural trade 
liberalization as if it will boost development in Africa.
In view of the pervasive influence of such erroneous and harmful policy advice and conditionalities, 
it is crucial to increase ‘policy space’ for governments to be able to pursue policies for development. Coun-
tries need to be able to choose or design their own development strategies as well as elaborate and imple-
ment more appropriate development policies. Besides enhancing policy space, it is also necessary to increase 
financial resources for development. The removal of the huge debt overhangs of the poorest countries through 
debt relief has been an important step in this direction. Massive and sustained increases in ODA are needed 
to kick-start investments and growth and, in the longer term, to reduce the continent’s resource gap and 
dependence on aid (UNCTAD 2006). Over two decades of economic stagnation, contraction and increased 
poverty, corruption, abuse as well as disease, conflict, and other scourges have also taken a huge toll on the 
continent’s economic, social and political fabric, and pro-active efforts are urgently required to build new 
capacities and capabilities for development.
As economic growth and development do not necessarily reduce poverty and inequalities, special 
efforts are needed to ensure such outcomes. The United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
provide some specific welfare targets and indicators for this purpose. Enhanced social expenditure should be 
universal as far as possible to ensure broad public support and, thus, sustainability, but selective targeting—
including affirmative action measures—may be needed to overcome long-term discrimination, marginaliza-
tion and neglect. After all, progress towards achieving the MDG indicators may still bypass the poor as even 
the rising tide of economic growth does not raise all boats.Economic Liberalization and Constraints to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa  27
The MDGs are important for and mutually reinforce the UN’s broader Development Agenda of 
internationally agreed development goals derived from the UN’s global summits and conferences, especially 
since the 1990s, such as the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Population and Development 
Conference in Cairo in 1994, the Beijing conference on women in 1995, the 1995 Copenhagen Summit, 
the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development and the Johannesburg conference on Sustainable 
Development of 2002, among others. This agenda has been reiterated and given greater coherence by the 
Millennium Declaration of 2000 and the Outcome Document of the World Summit in September 2005. 
It is now up to African governments to follow through with meaningful reforms to reinstitute sustainable 
development processes, and for the international community of donors and the Bretton Woods institutions 
to provide the financial means, other resources and policy space for them to do so.
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Appendices
 Table A1. GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$  
    
Annual average compound growth rates  1960-69  1970-79  1980-89  1990-99  2000-06 
    
Equatorial Guinea  17.6%  17.0% 
Angola  -2.3%  8.5% 
Chad  -1.2%  -3.9%  3.4%  -0.6%  8.5% 
Sierra Leone  1.9%  0.2%  -1.8%  -6.3%  8.2% 
Mozambique  -1.0%  2.3%  5.9% 
Sudan  -1.2%  0.7%  0.5%  2.8%  5.2% 
Tanzania  -0.2%  3.8% 
Botswana  4.8%  11.4%  7.8%  3.4%  3.6% 
Ethiopia  0.1%  3.4% 
Mauritius  4.9%  4.2%  3.1% 
    
Togo  5.8%  0.5%  -2.4%  -0.6%  -0.4% 
Malawi  2.6%  3.5%  -2.4%  1.6%  -0.6% 
Burundi  0.8%  1.0%  1.2%  -3.6%  -0.8% 
Eritrea  -1.2% 
Seychelles  0.5%  6.8%  1.8%  3.0%  -1.3% 
Cote d’Ivoire  4.3%  2.5%  -3.4%  0.0%  -1.6% 
Central African Republic  -0.1%  -0.2%  -1.2%  -1.0%  -1.8% 
Guinea-Bissau  0.0%  2.3%  -2.2%  -2.5% 
Liberia  1.9%  -0.5%  -6.4%  -3.0%  -5.1% 
Zimbabwe  1.2%  -1.4%  0.3%  0.0%  -5.1% 
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